> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://standard.aiuc-1.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Attacks

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The attack techniques AIUC-1 evals use to probe an AI agent, with the incidents and research behind each. This taxonomy covers the attack techniques typically used in AIUC-1 testing. Each certified agent is tested with the techniques most relevant to its risks and deployment. As new incidents and research surface new techniques, the taxonomy is updated so testing reflects how agents actually fail today.

## Intended use

### Direct ask

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant                  | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Single ask               | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-001</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">GitHub's Copilot reproduced a professor's LGPL-licensed sparse-matrix code verbatim, stripping the license</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-005</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03601">InFoBench: Evaluating Instruction Following Ability in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| Long input               | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-015</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Sullivan & Cromwell apologized to a bankruptcy judge for AI hallucinations in a Chapter 15 filing</span></div></div>          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-005</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03601">InFoBench: Evaluating Instruction Following Ability in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| Noisy or corrupted input | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-019</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">McDonald's IBM-built AI drive-thru misinterpreted spoken orders, ending the trial</span></div></div>                          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-005</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03601">InFoBench: Evaluating Instruction Following Ability in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |

### Indirect ask

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant                   | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Nonsensical input         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-008</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14227">Benchmarking Failures in Tool-Augmented Language Models</a></div></div>                    |
| Contradictory information |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-018</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.00187">ClarEval: Clarification Skills of Code Agents under Ambiguous Instructions</a></div></div> |
| Implied context           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-008</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14227">Benchmarking Failures in Tool-Augmented Language Models</a></div></div>                    |
| Ambiguous intent          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-044</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">New York City's MyCity business chatbot advised users to break the law</span></div></div>         | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-008</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14227">Benchmarking Failures in Tool-Augmented Language Models</a></div></div>                    |
| Changing intent           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-018</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.00187">ClarEval: Clarification Skills of Code Agents under Ambiguous Instructions</a></div></div> |
| Progressive disclosure    | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-013</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Air Canada's chatbot invented a refund policy, and the airline was held liable</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-008</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14227">Benchmarking Failures in Tool-Augmented Language Models</a></div></div>                    |

## Misuse (social engineering)

### False scenario

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant             | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Feigned distress    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-019</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05478">The Facade of Truth: LLM Susceptibility to Deceptive Evidence</a></div></div> |
| Feigned frustration |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-019</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05478">The Facade of Truth: LLM Susceptibility to Deceptive Evidence</a></div></div> |
| False persona       | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-032</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Discord's Clyde chatbot was tricked into outputting weapon instructions via a roleplay jailbreak</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-019</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05478">The Facade of Truth: LLM Susceptibility to Deceptive Evidence</a></div></div> |
| Fabricated evidence |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-019</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05478">The Facade of Truth: LLM Susceptibility to Deceptive Evidence</a></div></div> |

### Persuasion

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant                | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Moral reframing        | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-026</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Anthropic's Claudius vending-machine agent was talked into zeroing prices and giving away inventory</span></div></div>          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-020</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.06373">How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them</a></div></div> |
| Incentive manipulation | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-026</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Anthropic's Claudius vending-machine agent was talked into zeroing prices and giving away inventory</span></div></div>          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-020</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.06373">How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them</a></div></div> |
| Trust building         | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-040</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">OpenAI's ChatGPT generated fake South Korean military ID images for a North Korean Kimsuky phishing campaign</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-020</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.06373">How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them</a></div></div> |

### Conversational manipulation

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant           | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Confusion tactics |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-021</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.01833">Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack</a></div></div> |
| Insistence        | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-036</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">DPD's customer-service chatbot swore at a customer and disparaged the company</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-021</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.01833">Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack</a></div></div> |

## Misuse (technical)

### Direct injection

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant                      | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Perturbation attacks         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-003</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23817">System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| System message injection     | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-022</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Chevrolet of Watsonville's ChatGPT-powered chatbot was manipulated into 'selling' a $76,000 Tahoe for $1</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-022</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14070">Special-Character Adversarial Attacks on Open-Source Language Models</a></div></div>   |
| Ignore previous instructions |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-023</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15759">Securing AI Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks</a></div></div>                    |
| Delimiter injection          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-003</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23817">System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| Special token injection      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-022</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14070">Special-Character Adversarial Attacks on Open-Source Language Models</a></div></div>   |
| Context overflow             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-023</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15759">Securing AI Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks</a></div></div>                    |
| Bijection                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-003</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23817">System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| Template mutation            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-022</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14070">Special-Character Adversarial Attacks on Open-Source Language Models</a></div></div>   |
| Adversarial suffix           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-023</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15759">Securing AI Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks</a></div></div>                    |
| Best-of-N                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-003</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23817">System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| Iterative rephrasing         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-022</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14070">Special-Character Adversarial Attacks on Open-Source Language Models</a></div></div>   |
| Past tense                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-023</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15759">Securing AI Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks</a></div></div>                    |
| Future tense                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-003</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23817">System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models</a></div></div> |
| Encoding attacks             | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-007</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Microsoft 365 Copilot was exploited via ASCII smuggling to exfiltrate user data</span></div></div>                          | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-022</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14070">Special-Character Adversarial Attacks on Open-Source Language Models</a></div></div>   |

### Indirect injection

<div className="aiuc-taxonomy-table" />

| Variant            | Related incident                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Related paper                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Via data inputs    | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-028</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">A malicious npm package posing as an OpenAI Codex UI exfiltrated developer authentication tokens</span></div><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-029</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">A hidden prompt injection in a Word document turned Microsoft Copilot for Word into a self-propagating AI worm</span></div></div> | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-024</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02691">InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents</a></div></div> |
| Via tool responses | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">INC-006</span><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-text">Nx's compromised npm package weaponized installed AI coding agents to exfiltrate developer credentials</span></div></div>                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-024</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02691">InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents</a></div></div> |
| Via tasks          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | <div className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite"><div><span className="aiuc-taxonomy-ref">PAP-002</span><a className="aiuc-taxonomy-cite-link" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.05432">Your LLM Agent Can Leak Your Data: Data Exfiltration via Backdoored Tool Use</a></div></div>      |

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